Launching the Great Leap

Just after the return of the Chinese delegation from Moscow, when the CPC leadership was in the mood of "catching up with and overtaking" the imperialist countries, head of state Liu Shaoqi 刘少奇 (1898-1968) announced, on 2 December 1957, the new strategy to the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (Zhonghua Quanguo Zong Gonghui 中华全国总工会): China would catch up with and surpass Great Britain in the output of iron, steel and other major industrial products.

A few days later, head of the State Planning Commission (Guojia jihua weiyuanhui 国家计划委员会) Li Fuchun 李富春 (1900-1975) announced that after 15 years, China's steel output would be 40 million tons, which would be twice the British production at the time. Yet in his overall plans for the Second Five-Year Plan (Er wu jihua 二五计划, 1958-1962), Li Fuchun only imposed moderate raisings of production targets of the Second Five-Year Plan over those made during the 1st Session of the 8th Party Congress (中国共产党第八次全国代表大会第一次会议) from 15-27 September 1956.

The only exception was fertilizer whose target was doubled in order to make feasible the Twelve-Year Agricultural Programme (Shi'ernian nongye fazhang gangyao 十二年农业发展纲要) started in 1956, and agricultural targets of 1962 that were lowered with regards to the target figures as suggested in late 1956.

The only fields in which intensification of the factor inputs was made, was mobilisation of labour which was necessary because technical support by the Soviet Union might fail to arrive regarding Soviet committment in Eastern Europe.

The Four-Pests Campaign

In late 1957 and early 1958, virtually all high members of the Communist Party toured the country in order to assess the economic and political situation at the grass roots. In early January 1958, the Party leaders assembled for a conference in Hangzhou 杭州, Zhejiang, documents on which are not yet disclosed. The main topic of the meeting might have been the fight against the so-called "four pests" (chu sihai 除四害), namely rats, sparrows (later: cockroaches), flies, and mosquitoes. This fight was part of the Twelve-Year Agricultural Programme as part of a campaign ameliorating public health.

The campaign was accompanied by regular lists of animals killed the first of which appeared on 27 January in the newspaper Sichuan ribao 四川日报. Peasants killed rodents, dug out fly pupae and removed garbage. The People's Liberation Army (Renmin jiefang jun 人民解放军, PLA) observed the activities of rats and sparrows to develop tactics in fighting them. Sparrows were brought to death by shaking trees, terrifying them with flashlights or hitting the animals with bamboos. Women ran over the fields with white blankets or sheets to chase them away, while men beat drums to frighten them. The campaign was deeply admired by Mao who even wrote a poem on the fight against schistomiasis and bilharzia. It was accompanied by an increased interest in traditional Chinese medicine.

The Conference of Nanning 南宁会议, January 1958

On January 11 and 12, Mao invited to a conference in Nanning 南宁, Guangxi. It was aimed at mobilizing the Party for the projected production high tide. For this reason, Mao adopted a slogan that originated in the province of Anhui, to "battle hard for three years to change the face of China". He received proposals for water-conservancy projects and underlined future prospects by describing "basic changes" in the economy. Yet Mao also pushed away those who were too cautious in his eyes or criticised adventurist economic policy like the Premier Zhou Enlai 周恩来 (1898-1976), Minister of Commerce Chen Yun 陈云 (1905-1995), or Minister of Finance Li Xiannian 李先念 (1909-1992). Particularly the latter shied away from projects that might endanger the financial stability of China, which was an important factor of legitimacy for the CPC.

Mao, the practitioner, criticized those of the bureaucratic apparatus and its representatives like Li Xiannian for just bringing forward figures and documents to support their prudence instead of daring to go new ways. During the Nanning conference, Mao demanded that politics should dominate the bureaucracy and decided to commit his personal reputation for the envisaged leap. For this reason, all party members should be both "red" and expert and not forget what they were fighting for. For a last time, Mao Zedong appealed to follow the paradigm of the Soviet Union in the shape of Khrushchev's plans to catch up and overtake the imperialist US. China, if following this way and without resting too much on Soviet support, would have to rely on small-scale, indigenous and decentralized technology with only basic expertise.

The "Sixty Points of Working Methods" (Gongzuo fangfa liushi tiao 工作方法六十条)

The most important written result of the early phase of the Great Leap are Mao's "Sixty Points on Working Methods" (Gongzuo fangfa liushi tiao (cao'an 工作方法六十条（草案）). The draft document was mainly compiled by Mao himself, but with the support of Liu Shaoqi on the basis of consultation with local cadres. It was to serve the Party cadres as a reference work for the production upsurge. Art. 16 makes for the first time use of the expression "Great Leap Forward" (da yue jin ), which was hitherto only used for projects of water conservancy as invented by Zhou Enlai. Water-conservancy projects had been the first field in which the use of large-scale manpower had yielded surprising results between autumn 1957 and late 1958, and this sector of agriculture therefore served as a model for the labour-intensive development of other industrial and agricultural sectors.

Within the coming three years, a basic transformation of the look of most area was to be carried out, after fighting a "hard battle of three years" (ku zhan san nian 苦战三年, Art. 13). All rules and regulations which restricted the development of productivity were to be smashed (Art. 21-22). Being "red and expert" (hong yu zhuan 红与专), the cadres had to raise mass awakening, and the masses be permitted and encouraged to make new creations for the development of productivity. These activities were part of an uninterrupted revolution (bu duan geming 不断革命, Art. 21-22). In this way, Mao Zedong foreshadowed the concept of "permanent revolution" which was critical for the eventual launching of the Cultural Revolution (Schram 1971). The same is true for his chaos-inclined dictum that "imbalance was constant and absolute, while equilibrium was temporary and relative” (cong bu pingheng dao pingheng, you cong pingheng dao bu pingheng, xunhuan er yi 从不平衡到平衡，又从平衡到不平衡，循环不已).

Art. 23 defined the role of the government as overshadowed by the interventionist function of the Party on the local level. Art. 2 laid down fourteen points for a future forty-points industrial development programme (gongye fazhan gangyao sishi tiao 工业发展纲要“四十条”), perhaps to build a counterpart to the Twelve-Year Agricultural Programme which had likewise forty points. The conventional statistical programme of the Planning Commission responsible for FYP-targets was undermined by Art. 9, where Mao introduced a three-level dual program (santizhang 三本账) of 1) obligatory and public targets for the central authorities, 2) expected and non-public targets for the central authorities, of which part 2 was obligatory for the provincial authorities, which in turn had its own expected and non-public targets. This model was to be applied down to the district or county (xian 县) level. The targets were defined according to the principle of democratic centralism, with suggestions of raised targets coming from the centre, to be received and increased by the optimistic grassroots, and then handed back to the central administration which would define yet higher production targets. The result of this method was the statistical fiasco of 1959. The other articles of the Working Methods deal with higher rates of accumulation, greater collectivism, experimental plots, the popularization of positive experience, farms and factories run by schools and colleges, high-yield seed varieties. Two of the most famous instruments of the Great Leap were not described, namely People’s Communes, and backyard steel furnaces. In the last article, Mao announced to retire to the second front to have more time to focus on party work, perhaps also to avoid an intra-party struggle as in the Soviet Union in 1957, or to avoid the fate of Stalin who had been an autocrat until his death (MacFarquhar 1983: 32).

The 5th Session of the 1st National People's Congress, February 1958

The fifth and last session of the First National People's Congress (Di yi jie renmin daibiao dahui di wu ci huiyi 中华人民共和国第一届全国人民代表大会第五次会议) on 1-22 February, 1958 was the last occasion during which realistic production targets were pronounced in order to approve the national budget and the national economic plan of 1958. Li Xiannian presented his report on the implementation of the national budget for 1957 and the draft national budget for 1958 (Guanyu 1957 nian guojia yusuan zhixing qingkuang he 1958 nian guojia yusuan cao'an de baogao 《关于1957年国家预算执行情况和1958年国家预算草案的报告》, and Bo Yibo his report on the draft 1958 economic plan (Guanyu 1958 jingji jihua cao'an de baogao 《关于1958经济计划草案的报告》). The output targets presented by Bo Yibo were by no means extravagant, with a raise of 5.9 % for grain, 6.7 % for cotton, 19.2 % for steel, 17.2 % for coal, and 18 % or electric power (MacFarquhar 1983: 33). Yet Li Xiannian announced that the increase government aid to the development of agriculture would be considerable, with 40.8 % more than the previous year. This trends went hand in hand with the strategy of fostering agriculture in the same way as the industry, or to "walk on two legs", as Mao hat put it in his speech from 25 April 1956 "On the Ten Major Relationships" (Lun shi da guanxi 论十大关系).

The Chengdu Conference 成都会议, March 1958

Between 8 and 26 March 1958, the CPC Central Committee held a work conference in Chengdu 成都, Sichuan. Mao made three great speeches (10, 20, and 22 March). He stressed China's continuing friendship with the Soviet Union, but voted for considering local conditions instead of just copying Soviet models. He also negated the importance of relying on the advice of (Soviet) experts and suggested opting for native experiments. China had gained sufficient experience and some understanding of the difference between the two economies. This emancipation was accompanied by a general reduction of dependence from the Soviet Union, first in the cultural sphere, then in the economic one, and finally also in the field of international politics. China had become strong and confident enough to counter Soviet dominance of China's northeast and northwest.

Mao's focus of the speech of 22 March was the question of mass mobilisation. China with her huge population would have to rely on the labour factor to increase production. Yet Mao went even further to lay the Great Leap fully into the hands of the masses and their innovation spirit, instead of trusting experts. Truth, he said, was more important than knowledge, and therefore the opinions of so-called experts – including the bureaucrats of the National Statistical Bureau – was of no great value for economic growth. The range of "experts" also included the intellectuals or members of the bourgeoisie. Their literary products were not as valuable as the realistic-romantic folk songs. In this way, Mao attacked the intellectuals for not having cooperated during the Hundred-Flowers Campaign, and inspired the collection of thousands of folk songs during the coming years.

Two days earlier, Mao had called on everyone to go all out, aim high and achieve greater, faster, better and more economic results (you duo, you kuai, you hao, you sheng 又多、又快、又好、又省). The province of Henan had already set targets for this common enterprise which he appealed all to follow. The authorities of that province planned to implement the targets of the Twelve-Year Agricultural Programme all within one year: Surpassing grain yields by 100 %, build a comprehensive water concervancy and irrigation system, and elimiate the four pests and also illiteracy. While target raises of 20-30 per cent had been viewed as over-enthusiastic or even "leftist" at the turn of the year, a few months later they would be assessed as too cautious or even "rightist". Mao had begun to encourage provincial leaders to engage in intra-provincial competition over production targets.

The substantial raise of agricultural production might achievable not just by input of the factor labour, but also my mechanization. Mechanization in the Soviet Union was achieved by the widespread institutionalization of machine-tractor stations; in the United States, where totally different factor proportions (land and labour) prevailed than in China, with abundant land and scarce labour, mechanization in agriculture likewise played an important factor. In China, the question was not whether to use mechanization or not, but the issue was the order in which collectivization and mechanization were to be applied.

While Liu Shaoqi opted for mechanization first, Mao preferred the opposite. Other persons, like Bo Yibo, argued that the huge reservoir of manpower in China forbade the premature introduction of machinery. A compromise was found in the assumption that the widespread introduction of double-cropping would raise the demand for the factor labour, and for this purpose, the use of machinery would be helpful. Machines like the Soviet double-bladed, double-wheeled plough (shuanglun shuanghua li 双轮双铧犁) or tractors might be produced by and commonly owned by agricultural production cooperatives.

The 2nd Session of the 8th Party Congress, May 1958

From 5-23 May 1958, the 2nd Session of the 8th Party Congress (Zhongguo Gongchandang di ba jie quanguo dianbiao dahui di er ci huiyi 中国共产党第八届全国代表大会第二次会议) was held in Beijing. During the congress, agricultural secretary of the CPC, Tan Zhenlin 谭震林 (1902-1983), presented "Notes on the outline for agricultural development" (Guanyu nongye fazhan gangyao de shuoming 《关于农业发展纲要的说明》), yet the decisive speech for the launch of the Great Leap was delivered by Liu Shaoqi. Based on the experiences of the spring, he said, the country witnessed immense progress on each front. In comparison with 1957, the production figures of steel, coal, and agriculture promised much higher yields for the present year. The Party would unite with the masses and lead them to achieve progressive changes.

While Liu saw himself as the organizer, Mao desired that "the initiative and creativity of the masses might explode". The Party cadres should learn from the people and follow them. Mao also accused those opposing speedier development as rightists, and predicted that the autumn harvest of 1958 would demonstrate that the Leap would be possible and had been the right choice. In contrast to 1956, few members of the politicial elite opposed the new leap programme of 1958. Nonetheless, it was necessary that Mao brought the bureaucrats into line.

The central bureaucrats were hesitant because the decentralization deprived them of considerable administrative powers over industry, commerce and finance. The provincial bureaucrats were opposed because financial responsibility would be heaped on their shoulders (while the central government was relieved). Chen Yun feared that decentralization deprived the central government of its revenues. The planners Li Fuchun and Li Xiannian feared chaos in the planning of the economy. In order to balance out these fears, Mao had raised one of his supporters, Tan Zhenlin, to the status of full member of the Politbureau. In order to stress the importance of local government, the Party leader of Shanghai, Ke Qingshi 柯庆施 (1902-1965), and that of Sichuan, Li Jingquan 李井泉 (1909-1989), were likewise made Politbureau members. Throughout the provinces, some purges were carried out to eliminate Party cadres resisting to the new Leap policy. The Party secretariat played an important role in decision making and outwitted the State Council as the place of policy making. For this reason, formal meetings played a lesser role than "guerilla-style" (MacFarquhar 1983: 62) inspection tours through the country.

On 25 May 1958, Mao and the Politbureau members travelled to the Ming tomb area near Changping 昌平 northwest of Beijing where reservoir constructions were conducted. Eminent Party leaders stayed at the spot and laboured together with the masses. This event was a propagandistic expression that the ancient Yan'an style was revived according to which Party cadres engaged in manual labour for the build-up of socialism.