Sunzi bingfa 孫子兵法

Sunzi bingfa 孫子兵法 "The methods of war by Master Sun" (better known as "The Art of War"), short Sunzi 孫子 "Master Sun", is probably the most important and popular military classic of ancient China. It is also known under the titles Wu Sunzi bingfa 吳孫子兵法 "The art of war by Master Sun from the state of Wu", Sun Wu bingfa 孫武兵法 "The art of war by Sun Wu" or Sun Wu bingshu 孫武兵書 "The book on war by Sun Wu".

During the Song period 宋 (960-1279), it was rated the "ancestor" of all military books. Its fame spread soon to neighbouring countries like Japan (known there as Sonshi or Sonshi no heihō), where it became known during the Tang period 唐 (618-907), and has been a studied hundredfold in the West.

The author of the book was believed to be the historical person Sun Wu 孫武, who originated in the regional state of Qi 齊 during the late Spring and Autumn period 春秋 (770-5th cent. BCE). He wrote 13 chapters on military strategy, which he presented to King Helü 闔閭 (r. 514-496) from the state of Wu 吳, a state located on the southeast coast. Together with Wu Zixu 伍子胥, Sun Wu was able to defeat the powerful state of Chu 楚 in central China and conquer its capital (see also Zhou military).

In his discussions with King Helü, Sun Wu explained the advantages and disadvantages of the land and tax reform by the various noble houses in the state of Jin 晉 and the downfall of the houses of Fan 范, Zhonghang 中行, and Zhi 知. When King Fucha 夫差 (r. 495-473) of Wu killed Wu Zixu and replaced him with Bo Pi 伯嚭, Sun Wu decided to retire.

The book Sunzi was traditionally ascribed to Sun Wu. During the Song period, Mei Yaochen 梅堯臣 (1002-1060) and Ye Shi 葉適 (1150-1223) brought forward some doubts about such an early date of composition. They argued it was written during the Warring States period 戰國 (5th cent.-221 BCE). It might even be that the author was Sun Bin 孫臏, who had written the military treatise known as Sun Bin bingfa 孫臏兵法. This book was lost then and was only rediscovered in a Han-period 漢 (206 BCE-220 CE) tomb in 1972. Japanese scholars and the Chinese historian Qi Sihe 齊思和 (1907-1980) in the 1930s also raised doubts about the authorship of Sun Wu. Modern scholars think that the Sunzi bingfa was composed as a draft during the 5th century and then later revised by Sun Bin according to contemporary tactics and strategy. The received version is thus a product from the Warring States period.

The Sunzi consists of 13 chapters. The main concept is that campaigns have to be carefully planned before setting out. Although many chapters talk about practical things, the language is in many passages short, enigmatic and somewhat philosophical, which makes it difficult to interpret specific phrases.

The Sunzi had always attracted the interest of military strategists. Although the original number of chapters is identical to that of the received version, the text seems to have changed over time. Particularly during the Han period, strategists enlarged the book and attached illustrations. Ren Hong's 任宏 revision, for example, made an 82-chapter book of it, with 9 illustrations. Therefore, the oldest commentaries to the Sunzi, like that of Cao Cao 曹操 (155-220) from the 3rd century CE, had to return to the original version. Han-period additions were consequently avoided in early commentaries and were therefore lost as early as the Tang period, which some persons thought was a pity. Cao Cao was even charged with having forged the received Sunzi version.

In 1972, some bamboo texts in a Han-period tomb were excavated in Yinqueshan 銀雀山, Shandong, among them the Sunzi bingfa and Sun Bin bingfa. This proves that at the beginning of the Han period, there was a tradition of a Master Sun from Wu (the Sunzi bingfa), and one from a Master Sun from the state of Qi (the Sun Bin bingfa). The text of the Yinqueshan Sunzi is somewhat different from the received version, but identical to quotations in Han- and Tang-period sources. The tomb library also contained wooden slips (mudu 木牘) inscribed with chapter titles of the Sunzi, with six chapters of the first part (shangbian 上編), and seven chapters, the so-called Qishi 七勢 "Seven conditions", as the second part (xiabian 下編). The Han-period original also included five complete chapters which are not found in the received version of the Sunzi.

The Sunzi stresses that warfare is essential for the survival of a state and is, therefore, a field to which it is necessary to pay attention. Once defeated in war, a country would never rise again. The enlightened ruler, thus, had to care for war and good generals to study it in detail to be prepared in advance.

Master Sun explains the five factors (wu shi 五事) influencing victory and defeat. Government conduct (dao 道), weather (tian 天), territory (di 地), generals (jiang 將), and tactics (fa 法) were the main themes covered by Sun Wu. A ruler had to be enlightened about strategy; weather and territory had to be observed and selected; generals had to be competent; commands and tactics had to be clear; the army had to be strong; the troops had to be trained; and rewards and punishments had to be clarified (the seven plans, qiji 七計).

The ruler had to see to it that his people were willing to fight for him and the state and eventually sacrifice themselves. He had thus to exert a virtuous government which was attractive enough for the population; he had to nourish proper conduct of government (xiu dao 修道) and to care for the observation of laws (bao fa 保法).

The Sunzi bingfa emphasises the importance of capable generals representing the state on the battlefield. Wisdom, trust, humanity, courage, and strictness were the most important requirements for an able commander. The commander had to know himself as good as he knew the enemy (zhi bi zhi ji 知彼知己), his army as well as the strategy of the adverse state. Generals should be able to give the army a specific appearance (shi xing 示形) to deceive the enemy, for instance, feigning weakness, distance, or incapability, and the general to apply his strengths (ren shi 任勢) in the right situation, but also to take over responsibility for wrong decisions (bu bi zui 不避罪).

A general had to use the appropriate method of reward and punishment; he must neither be too lenient nor too harsh, but a general had to be able to have both a military (wu 武) spirit and a civilised (wen 文) mind. A military spirit would make the troops obedient, and a civilised mind would make them loyal. Inimical troops expressing their willingness to submit were to be treated well and integrated into the army, if they wished to do so.

To achieve complete victory, five points were to be observed: to know whether one can fight or not; to know how to use which type of troops; to unify the spirit of all units of the army; to have the anxious ones encouraged by the brave ones; and that a capable general also acts without royal command. Generals who were not clear about the abilities of the enemy and their own troops and territorial conditions would only achieve half a victory. A quick win was the best result an army could achieve, but it was necessary to be well prepared for battle, in other words, triumphing before going into battle (xian sheng er hou qiu zhan 先勝而後求戰). The best method of warfare was to achieve victory by avoiding battle (bu zhan er qu ren zhi bing, shan zhi shan zhe 不戰而屈人之兵，善之善者).

Therefore, Sun Wu's general advice is to avoid siege warfare and to prefer quick battles in the field. On the battlefield, the enemy had to be forced to follow what the own army dictated to him. The inimical general had to be forced to be passive while the initiative stayed with oneself. An enemy hiding behind his fortifications had to be lured out, and his weak points to be attacked. While the own troops had to be concentrated to achieve full fighting power it was necessary to have the adverse troops scattered and weakened.

A widespread tactic to obtain victory was to attack the enemy first with the central phalanx (zheng 正 "orthodox" formations), which he mainly expected, and then to make victory sure by surprise attacks with spontaneously arranged units (qi 奇 "unorthodox" formations). The number of the troops also played a role in Sunzi's considerations (massed against dispersed, fenshu 分數), true strength (shi 實) against seeming strength (xu 虛), battle formations (xing 形) and command structures (ming 名), as well as the character of the enemy. An arrogant enemy had to be lured by submissive comportment and displaying weakness. Most importantly, a general would have to be patient enough to wait until he was sure of victory (dai di zhi ke sheng 待敵可勝).

In his instructions on territory, Master Sun admonished to avoid eight types of attacks (ba jie 八戒), namely attacking an enemy having the high ground, an enemy having his back to a hill, pursuing feigned retreats, attacking elite troops, swallowing the enemy's bait, thwarting an enemy retreating home, leaving no outlet for a surrounded enemy, and pressing an enemy which is cornered.

The position of a general is highly emphasised in the Sunzi bingfa. He is seen as the most crucial element in warfare and even seen as the one who decides over security and danger of a country.

As a text from the Zhou period, the Sunzi was influenced by contemporary philosophy and metaphysical beliefs (see Zhou philosophy). This can be seen in the many dualistic concepts used in the book or hits at the Five Agents.

There are ten (eleven) commentaries to the Sunzi, the so-called Shiyi jia zhu Sunzi 十一家注孫子. The commentators are Cao Cao (posthumous title Wei Wudi 魏武帝), Master Meng 孟氏 from the Liang period 梁 (502-557), the Tang-period scholars Li Quan 李荃 (c. 760), Du Mei 杜枚 (803-852), Chen Hao 陳皡, Jia Lin 賈林, and the Song-period scholars Mei Yaochen, Wang Xi 王皙 (early 11th cent.), He Yanxi 何延錫 (d. 956), and Zhang Yu 張預. The eleventh commentary is comments by Du You 杜佑 (735-812) in his encyclopaedia Tongdian 通典 from the Tang period.

Some additional comments have been collected by the Song-period scholar Zheng Youxian 鄭友賢 (Sunzi yishuo 孫子遺說).

The most critical editions of the Sunzi plus commentaries are the Song-period print of the Wei Wudi zhu Sunzi 魏武帝注孫子 in the series Pingjinguan congshu 平津館叢書, the Sunzi in the Song-period canon Wujing qishu 武經七書 "Seven Military Classics", contained in the reprint series Xu yigu congshu 續逸古叢書, and the Song print of the ten commentaries Shijia Sunzi hui zhu 十家孫子會注.

There are a lot of scholars who studied the Sunzi, like Lu Daje 陸達節 (1895-1968: Sunzi kao 孫子考, Sunzi bingfa shumu huibian 孫子兵法書目彙編), Sun Xingyan 孫星衍 (1753-1818: edition of the commentaries, with discussion of fragments), Bi Yixun 畢以珣 (Sunzi xulu 孫子敍錄), Yan Kejun 嚴可均 (1762—1843: complete literature of ancient times), Ma Guohan 馬國翰 (1794-1857: adds fragments in his Yuhan shanfang jiyi shu 玉函山房輯佚書), as well as Wang Renjun 王仁俊 (1866-1913: collection of fragments Jingji yiwen 經籍佚文).