Tributes (chaogong 朝貢) constituted an important means of diplomatic relations between China and other states and polities, and in the early ages between the kingdoms of the Xia 夏 (21th-17th cent. BCE), Shang 商 (17th-11th cent. BCE), and Zhou 周 (11th cent.-221 BCE) dynasties and various regional rulers. Other means of diplomacy included "alliance by marriage" (heqin 和親), border markets (hushi 互市), for instance, the famous tea-horse trade, and diplomatic missions (jiaopin 交聘).
The word gong 貢 was also used to mean field tax.
The tribute system in traditional China emerged from the belief that the culture of the Central Plain (Zhongyuan 中原) was superior to those surrounding it. China as the "Kingdom of the Centre" (Zhongguo 中國), with the mythological tribes Hua 華 and Xia 夏, was thus the cultural and economic master over the "barbarians of the four regions" (si yi 四夷, fan 蕃 or 番), categorised as "barbarians" of the north (Di 狄 or Hu 胡), the south (Man 蠻 or Miao 苗), the east (Yi 夷), and the west (Rong 戎).The desire of culturally inferior tribes to approach and learn from "China" made tributary relations quasi-necessary. The foreign barbarian tribes delivered presents to the Chinese state, which, in turn, used this relationship to dominate the barbarians, keep them at a distance, and forge alliances with them. Presenting tribute was an expression of acceptance not just of China's cultural but also of its political suzerainty. The acceptance of Chinese suzerainty entailed the accommodation to certain cultural phenomena, such as clothing, customs, social values of Confucianism or the Chinese script-based written language. From the Chinese viewpoint, "barbarians" were thus "transformed" (hua 化) into "humans".
The tribute system served for 2,000 years as a means of controlling political entities that could not be conquered and integrated into the Chinese empire. It was an instrument of self-defence against the northern steppe federations (Fairbank & Teng 1941: 137), or, in the case of the many native tribes of southwest China, a way to control them without interfering too much in internal policy or conquering the territory. China's experience of the threat posed by steppe peoples led to a system of integrating them through the tribute system in order to acculturate and absorb the barbarians, as far as possible. China herself was, from the beginning, a multi-ethnic state, in which ethnicity and "nation" did not play a role, but instead the paradigm of cultural achievements, as "supernationalist sanctions derived from the Confucian world order" (Fairbank 1953: 24). The tribute system was a means of neutralising barbarians by "sinicising" or "sinifying" them. Chinese superiority over the surrounding "barbarians" might perhaps not be expressed in military terms, but in wealth and cultural achievements.
The Chinese concept of world order drew a clear distinction between "us" and "them" and allowed other states to enter relations with China only through the tribute system. Foreign states were thus not permitted to negotiate with China on terms of equality (even though the regional states of the Zhou period did in fact negotiate on equal terms), but only within a constellation of one suzerain and many vassal states (or one patron and his clients). Foreign rulers and their successors were therefore formally invested by the emperors of China, as if they were merely noblemen within the confines of the Middle Kingdom. Granting a patent and a seal made foreign rulers part of a wider network of political relations and allowed China to "rule" indirectly over other states and tribes (see jimi system 羈縻). In this system, foreign chieftains were appointed "pacification commissioners" or given other semi-military titles. The chieftains in turn ruled on behalf of the Chinese dynasties, used Chinese official seals, and accepted the Chinese calendar as a symbol of imperial power. Investiture of a local ruler by the emperor of China enhanced his prestige among the local nobility. The indirect Chinese rule over native tribes in the southwest was abandoned in the course of the 18th century (see gaitu guiliu 改土歸流), and their territories were colonised.
In Confucianism, the reciprocal system of social relationships meant that if the tributary states were complacent, submissive and reverent (as a son towards his father, a wife towards her husband, or a student towards his teacher), the emperor of China would be benign and compassionate. He might therefore support one of his vassals if that state was threatened by others. Yet this also meant that the Chinese empire had the right to settle disputes or punish disobedient tributary states. In the sociological and political context of Confucianism, the sovereign was a model of virtue that had to be imitated by his subjects, and thus also by barbarians. A bountiful Chinese emperor therefore used to "cherish the men from afar" (huairou yuanren 懷柔遠人). The Chinese emperor himself, being the Son of Heaven, had similar duties to his physical fathers (see ancestral veneration) and towards Heaven as his "spiritual" father.
Diplomatic relations also led to military alliances, such as with the Uyghurs (Ch. Huihe 回紇), whose leaders were appointed by the Tang 唐 (618-907) court and, in turn, supported the Tang dynasty against rebels and insurgents such as An Lushan 安祿山 (703-757). To reward the Uyghurs for their support, the Tang dynasty began the silk-horse trade (juan-ma maoyi 絹馬貿易).
The gifts of the Chinese rulers to their vassals often exceeded the value of the tributes and thus served a more symbolic than an economic function. It might be justified to conclude that China bribed the barbarians to keep the peace (Rossabi 1983: 3) and that the submission of barbarians was actually bought and paid for (Fairbank & Teng 1941: 141). Moreover, the Chinese government bore all expenses for the diplomatic missions.
Even the tribute missions were asked to deliver rare and precious objects. The Chinese side held that it did not profit from the tributes because China was self-sufficient and nothing essential could be obtained from foreigners. Apart from strange and exotic things, the Chinese side was not really interested in beliefs and politics and showed scant concern for developing true proficiency in foreign affairs (Rossabi 1983: 3).
Beyond their political connotations, diplomatic missions also had cultural and economic significance. On their return to their homelands, foreign missions took with them objects and ideas of Chinese culture, purchased Chinese goods, and presented interesting commodities from their native lands in Chinese markets. Trade and tribute were thus "cognate aspects of a single system of foreign relations" (Fairbank & Teng 1941: 140).
Alongside receiving foreign envoys, the Chinese state also sent embassies abroad, for instance, Zhang Qian 張騫 (d. 114 BCE), who was sent to Central Asia in search for allies against the steppe federation of the Xiongnu 匈奴, or Lu Jia 陸賈 (d. 170), who was dispatched to the autonomous state of Nanyue 南越 in southern China. During the Tang period, envoys abroad were called rufanshi 入番使 "commissioners entering barbarian [lands]", and during the Song period 宋 (960-1279) guoxinshi 國信使 "commissioners entrusted by the state". A general Chinese word for diplomatic envoy was qianshi 遣使.
During the Western Zhou period 西周 (11th cent.-770 BCE), the delivery of tributes was part of investiture ceremonies in which the king of Zhou 周 (11th cent.-221 BCE) invested regional rulers or formally confirmed the succession of one of them. The regional rulers normally presented (nagong 納貢, tonggong 通貢) to the king of the "central government" in Zongzhou 宗周 (close to Xi'an 西安, Shaanxi) and later in Chengzhou 成周 (Luoyang 洛陽, Henan) local products (gongpin 貢品) that were not easily obtainable in the domain of the Zhou rulers. The chapter Yugong 禹貢 in the Classic Shangshu 尚書 "Book of Documents" describes which products originated in which province of the Zhou empire. In return, the Zhou kings presented the regional rulers with lavish gifts (huici 回賜), such as precious bronze vessels bearing an inscription reporting the investiture ceremony and listing the king's presents of clothes, insignia, weapons or chariots.
With the foundation of the empire by the Qin 秦 (221-206 BCE) and Han 漢 (206 BCE-220 CE) dynasties, these formal ceremonies became obsolete, and "tributary" goods were brought to the capital cities through trade. The tributary system shifted to a different level of relationship, namely that of China with independent polities that accepted, in some way, China's suzerainty, for instance, the city states of the Tarim Basin, the Korean states Koguryŏ 高句麗, Paekche 百濟, and Silla 新羅, Dian 滇 in today's Yunnan province, the Shan states 撣 and Yelang 夜郎, the steppe tribes of the Xiongnu 匈奴 and Wusun 烏孫, countries in the far west like Dayuan 大宛, Daqin 大秦, or polities from the northeast like the Wuhuan 烏桓 and the Mohe 靺鞨, and even the tribes of Japan (Wonu 倭奴). In 166 CE, a party of merchants even presented a forged public letter allegedly written by the Roman emperor Marcus Aurelius. Jesuit Fathers observed this custom still in the 16th century, when Rome had long ceased to exist.
The official dynastic histories describe foreign countries not only because readers might be interested in such matters, but also because the Chinese state had diplomatic relations with them, making these states part of China's political system. The Northern Wei 北魏 (386-534) empire received a mission from India, which had travelled all the way through the Pamir Range and Central Asia. They brought with them horses, lions, camels, wild animals, elephants and rhinos, as well as a wide range of precious stones, metals, tortoiseshell, woolen fabric, "golden felt" with gold threads, and many other items, including Buddhist sutras, and parties of Buddhist monks who would instruct Chinese novices. As successors of the Xiongnu, the Rouran 柔然 dominated the northern steppe and were to be dealt with through the tribute system.
The Han dynasty established a state office responsible for guests and interpreters to guide foreign visitors. Han-period sources mention no fewer than 36 states (Fairbank & Teng 1941: 144). As diplomatic procedures refined, the Tang dynasty introduced the office of the secretary in charge of guests (zhuke langzhong 主客郎中) for envoys from the forty countries that had official contact with China. Envoys were given official tokens that allowed them to travel faster and under protection. Embassies were allotted specific time spans to travel to the court in Chang'an 長安 (today's Xi'an 西安, Shaanxi). The Court of Dependencies (honglusi 鴻臚寺) organised lodging for guests and the intricate court ceremonies. During their stay in the capital, ambassadors were questioned, allowing the court to gather information on foreign countries and their political strategies. The geographer Jia Dan 賈耽 (730-805), for instance, obtained much information on foreign countries through interviews with guests. The Tang court also compiled some dictionaries, as can be learnt from ancient book catalogues (Schafer 1963: 28). Merchants accompanied the "politicians" in the diplomatic mission to the prescribed frontier markets or the capital, where they were allowed to buy and sell for a period of several days.
During the Tang period 唐 (618-907), diplomatic relationship was maintained with the kingdom of Tibet (Tubo 吐蕃), the state of Nanzhao 南詔 (and later Dali 大理) in Yunnan, the country of Dashi 大食, a common term for Persians and Arabs, and various states of the Soghdiana in Central Asia. Apart from Korea and Japan, the Tang had intensive contacts with the Gök Türks (Tujue 突厥) and their successors, the Uyghurs (Huihe 回紇).
Foreign countries profited enormously from the trade. In all important cities, colonies of foreigners resided and brought with them their religious creeds, such as Nestorianism, Manichaeism or Mazdaism. Caravan routes led to Central and West Asia and India, passing through the oasis cities of Dunhuang 敦煌, Turfan (Tulufan 吐魯番), Hami 哈密 and Khotan (Yutian 于闐). Naval routes crossed the sea to the Korean states and Japan, or to the state of Bohai 渤海 (Korean reading Parhae) in the far northeast, while southern routes went into Southeast Asia, India, and Persia and even the port of Sīrāf close to Basra (modern Iraq). Chinese merchandise went abroad, and merchants travelled on the ships of foreign "argosies" (Schafer 1963: 12). Guangzhou 廣州 (in today's Guangdong) gained importance as an overseas trade port. Apart from the famous Silk Road in the northwest, there was an overland route through Sichuan and Yunnan, running through Zomia (van Schendel 2005) and ending in Bengal. The Chinese upper class imported men (slaves, dwarfs, musicians and dancers), domestic and wild animals, furs and feathers, plants, woods, foods, aromatics, drugs, textiles, pigments, minerals, jewels, metals, books, and various secular and religious objects. They developed a taste for foreign clothes, dishes, literature, and arts, such as songs from Khotan, a city famous for its musicians.
The Tang court maintained a strict policy of secluding foreigners in their own quarters and forbade intermarriage (Schafer 1963: 22). There were limits on the export of Chinese silks and the import of foreign goods. However, the nobility's taste for luxury goods contrasted with a political programme of keeping foreigners or "barbarians" at a distance. On certain occasions, the policy of segregation went so far that pogroms broke out, such as the one in Yangzhou 揚州 against Persians and Arabs (Schafer 1963: 23).
Diplomatic missions between China and powerful states were conducted on an equal footing. For instance, diplomatic missions occurred every two years between Tang China and the kingdom of Tibet. Some of the legates stayed for years in the capital city of the counterpart and were thus forerunners of modern diplomats. There was a range of occasions when friendly states sent envoys, for instance, when a ruler or an heir apparent died, on a ruler's birthday, when requesting support, when concluding alliances, or when sending monks or imperial brides.
Certain developments during the Tang period demonstrated that China's political and military superiority was not permanent. In 751, the Arabs invaded Central Asia; the state of Nanzhao in today's Yunnan pushed back Tang armies; the various states of Korea and Vietnam repeatedly expelled the Chinese; and the kingdom of Tibet, along with the federation of the Türks and later the Uyghurs, resisted Chinese power. This was particularly evident in the 10th century, when China itself was split between the successive Five Dynasties 五代 (907-960) in the north and the Ten States 十國 (902~979) in the south. The Kitans in the northern steppe capitalised on this situation, demanding tribute from several of the Five Dynasties and even interfering in their succession. The Later Jin 後晉 (936-946) was willing not only to send thousands of bolts of silk and tea to the north but also to cede land to them, and thus accepted the Kitan khan as superior by giving him the title "Paternal Emperor" (fu huangdi 父皇帝). In return, the Later Jin received horses, which were important for military affairs. The state of Wu-Yue 吳越 (907-978) in the southeast established diplomatic relations with Korea and Japan and likewise sent tributes to the Kitans. This attitude benefited Wu-Yue enormously and made it the wealthiest of the many states on Chinese soil at the time (Worthy 1983).
A novel situation emerged during the Song period 宋 (960-1279), when northern and north-western China were occupied by states that claimed equal status with the Song, namely the Kitan Liao 遼 (907-1125) state, the Tangutan Western Xia 西夏 (1038-1227) state, and later the Jurchen Jin 金 (1115-1234) state. China was no longer superior to other states but "among equals" (Rossabi 1983). The Song therefore established strict and complex rules for diplomatic procedure, including prescribed audiences with the emperor, the empress, and the heir apparent, held in fixed places, and banquets conducted according to set rules (Fairbank & Teng 1941: 147). Foreign states had to first announce a mission and request permission. The number of participants was restricted, as was the frequency (chaoqi 貢期) of missions and the wealth of tributes. The reason for these restrictions was simply the cost of board and lodging, the organisation of security and banquets, and the market activities carried out during the visits. The Kitans and Jurchens imitated the complex Chinese system of diplomatic reception.
The Song dynasty, described as a "lesser empire" (Wang 1983) vis-à-vis the Kitans, paid them annual tributes of 200,000 bolts of silk and 100,000 taels/liang of silver after the treaty of Chanyuan 澶淵 in 1005. Emperor Gaozong 宋高宗 (r. 1127-1162) of the Southern Song dynasty 南宋 (1127-1279) accepted the suzerainty of the Jin empire and was thus, even by the "barbarian" Jin empire, invested as emperor of the Song (Bao 1998). At the same time, Song China engaged actively in foreign trade with its enemies in the north and even maintained a favourable balance of trade with the Jurchens (Rossabi 1983: 8). The Song also traded overseas with Southeast Asian countries, and Chinese merchants gradually replaced Arab dominance of the South China Sea. Around the year 1000, the Chinese state created a monopoly over overseas foreign trade and founded the superintendency of merchant shipping (shibosi 市舶司) in Guangzhou.
On the one hand, the Yuan dynasty 元 (1279-1368), founded by the Mongols, inherited the Chinese imperial system and received embassies from the Uyghurs, the Tanguts, Korea, Annam, Champa, Dali, the "gold-teeth people" (jinchi 金齒) of Yunnan and Laos, and from Fulang 拂郎 or Fulin 拂菻 (i.e., Syria?). On the other hand, it practised - at least in the early, conquest phase - a "all-or-nothing" policy, meaning it did not accept indirect rule but demanded total submission. Only when this policy failed, as in the invasions of Japan, or when resistance was successful, as in Southeast Asia, did it revert to the traditional Chinese mode.
In addition to the superintendancy of merchant shipping in Guangzhou, similar institutions existed in Quanzhou 泉州, Fujian (known in Europe by the Arab designation Zaytun), Wenzhou 溫州, Ningbo 寧波 (at that time Qingyuan 慶元), Hangzhou 杭州 and Ganbu 澉浦 in Zhejiang, as well as Shanghai. Foreign traders were confined to these ports, and trade was possible only through government-owned warehouses. The trade was supervised by officials directly responsible to the central government, for instance, by collecting the levied tariffs of 30 per cent ad valorem (Fairbank 1953: 46). It can be seen that the restriction to a fixed number of ports and the strict control of trade by state authorities were not inventions of late imperial China, but a thousand-year-old institution.
During the Ming period, the number of tributary states increased considerably through overseas trade with Southeast Asia, the Indian coast, and even East Africa. Overseas diplomatic trade was known as gongbo maoyi 貢舶貿易 and was pursued during the seven famous voyages of Zheng He 鄭和 (1371-1433 or 1435), who was the first - and only - Chinese official to travel abroad over such a long distance. Official descriptions of the countries he visited appear in the books Xingcha shenglan 星槎勝覽, Yinya shenglan 瀛涯勝覽, Xiyang chaogong dianlu 西洋朝貢典錄 and Shuyu zhouzi lu 殊域周咨錄. A map called Zhenghe hanghai tu 鄭和航海圖 is included in the military book Wubeizhi 武備志. Primarily for cost reasons, the missions ended in 1433, but the Southeast Asian states contacted during that period remained listed, even though they ceased to present tributes after 1460 (Fairbank & Teng 1941: 155). After 1460, the focus of diplomatic relations clearly shifted from Southeast Asia to the states, polities and tribes of the northwest, mainly to Hami and Turfan, the funnels of the Central Asian caravan trade. Nonetheless, lists of tributary or vassal states of China retained these countries far into the 18th century.
Ryūkyū 琉球 and Chosŏn 朝鮮 were permitted to deliver tributes every second or third year, whereas Japanese diplomatic missions were allowed only once every seven or ten years. Annam, Zhenla (Cambodia), Champa, Java, and Siam visited China every third year, and the closer Central Asian states every fifth.
The average time diplomatic missions spent in the imperial capital was three to five days, with the exception of Chosŏn and Ryūkyū, whose diplomats could stay as long as they wished (Hong 1998). They were hosted by the Ministry of Rites (libu 禮部), which was responsible for "guest rites" (binli 賓禮, see five rites). The delivery of tributes was closely tied to intricate ceremonies, the most notorious of which was the ninefold prostration with "knocking the head" (ketou 磕頭 or koutou 叩頭) against the earth, known in the West as the kowtow or kotow. It was famously refused by Lord Macarntey in 1793, while Dutch ambassadors of the same period performed it (Fairbank xxx). The embassy took residence in the Interpreters and Translators Institute (huitong siyi guan 會同四譯館). With the exception of certain aboriginal border tribes, whose the embassies were under the supervision of the Ministry of War (bingbu 兵部), all others were under the management of the Bureau of Receptions (zhuke qinglisi 主客清吏司) of the Ministry of Rites. From the Ming period on, missions had to present a seal of the imperial court before being allowed to enter "Chinese" territory. Only a restricted number of persons was granted entrance to Beijing, while the rest of the party had to stay in the suburbs.
The voyages of Zheng He in the early 15th century were intended to bring the flourishing private junk trade into the tribute system of the Ming empire. The attempt was abandoned after Emperor Chengzu's 明成祖 (r. 1402-1424) death.
Jesuit missionaries such as Matteo Ricci (Ch. Li Madou 利瑪竇, 1552-1610) provided the Ming court with world maps and informed it about Europe and the wider world, but their knowledge fell into oblivion or was eventually ignored during the early and high Qing periods. There was "utter and indiscriminate confusion" (Fairbank 1953: 12) not only about states in Southeast Asia and on the Indian coast (designations and locations) but even more so about European countries. The old term Folangji 佛朗機 "Franks" referred to Portugal, Spain, France, or Italy, while Spain might also be termed Gansila 干絲臘 (for Castile), and Italy was the location of the Holy See, which also sent missions. The nature of the Jesuit mission itself was complex, because the Fathers hailed from various countries and spoke languages other than their own, yet served the Pope. Northern Europeans were often referred to as hongmaoyi 紅毛衣 "red-haired barbarians", without clearly distinguishing between English, Dutch, or Swedish persons. European ships came from the South China Sea, and European countries therefore appear in lists among polities on the Malay Peninsula or the Indian coast. Ming-period sources therefore discerned between the "Lesser Western Sea" (Xiao Xiyang 小西洋, the Indian Ocean) and the "Larger Western Sea" (Da Xiyang 大西洋, the Atlantic Ocean).
The first official European embassy in 1521 came from Portugal (which had traded in China since 1514), and only a few other states sent their diplomats to Beijing in the following 250 years, namely the Netherlands, Russia, the Holy See, and Great Britain, but all of them after the demise of the Ming. No fewer than 150 self-styled "rulers" were trading with China in 1502 (Fairbank 1953: 32), and it was well known to the Jesuit Father Bento de Góis (1562-1607) that foreign merchants often forged public letters in the names of kings to obtain trade rights. The Ming dynasty established superintendencies (tijusi) allowing foreign trade in Guangzhou, Quanzhou, and Mingzhou (明州, i.e., Ningbo), but only Guangzhou remained after 1522, as the infestation of the East China Sea by Wokou pirates 倭寇 forced the Ming state to shut down ports and closely supervise the coastline. Thereafter, much of European trade was controlled by the Portuguese, who had a settlement in Macao (Aomen 澳門) since 1557 and regularly traded in Guangzhou since 1578.
| 東南夷 Eastern and Southern Barbarians | ||
|---|---|---|
| 朝鮮國 | Chaoxian | Chosŏn (Korea) |
| 日本國 | Riben | Japan |
| 琉球國 | Liuqiu | Ryūkyū |
| 安南國 | Annan | Annam (northern Vietnam) |
| 真臘國 | Zhenla | Cambodia |
| 暹羅國 | Xianluo | Siam (Thailand) |
| 占城國 | Zhancheng | Champa (southern Vietnam) |
| 爪哇國 | Zhuawa | Java (old Shepo 闍婆) |
| 彭亨國 | Pengheng | Pahang (east coast of Malay Peninsula) |
| 百花國 | Baihua | ? (Coromandel coast of India) |
| 三佛齊國 | Sanfoqi | Srivijaya, i.e., Palembang |
| 浡泥國 | Boni | Brunei |
| 須文達那國 | Xuwendana | Samudra (eastern coast of Sumatra) |
| 蘇門答剌國 | Sumendala | Samudra, perhaps Aceh (northern tip of Sumatra) |
| 西洋瑣里國 | Xiyang Suoli | Chola "in the Western Ocean" (southeast India) |
| 瑣里國 | Suoli | Chola, idem or close-by |
| 覽邦國 | Lanbang | ? (island group east of Singapore) |
| 淡巴國 | Danba | ? (= Langyaxiu 狼牙脩, i.e., Lankasuka, northern Malay Peninsula) |
| 蘇祿國 | Sulu | Sulu Archipelago |
| 古里國 | Guli | Calicut (southwest coast of India) |
| 滿剌加國 | Manlajia | Malacca (southwest coast of Malay Peninsula) |
| 娑羅國 (=婆羅) | Shaluo (s.l. Poluo) | Borneo |
| 阿魯國 | Alu | Aru (northeast coast of Sumatra) |
| 小葛蘭國 | Xiaogelan | Quilon (southwestern tip of India) |
| 榜葛剌國 | Banggela | Bengal |
| 錫蘭山國 | Xilanshan | Ceylon (Sri Lanka) |
| 召納撲兒國 | Zhaonapu'er | Jaunpur (close to Benares) |
| 拂麻國 (=拂菻) | Fuma (s.l., Fulin) | Syria ("Fulin" is a multiple distortion of the word "Rum") |
| 柯枝國 | Kezhi | Cochin (southwest India) |
| 麻林國 | Malin | Melinde (east coast of Africa near Mombasa) |
| 呂宋國 | Lüsong | Luzon (Philippines) |
| 碟里國 * | Dieli | ? |
| 日羅夏治國 * | Riluoxiazhi | ? |
| 合貓里國 * | Hemaoli | Marinduque (southeast of Luzon, Philippines) |
| 古里班卒國 * | Gulibangzu | Pansur (west coast of Sumatra) |
| 打回國 * | Dahui | ? |
| 忽魯謨斯國 (忽魯母思) * | Hulumosi (Hulumusi) | Hormuz (Persian Gulf) |
| 甘把里國 (甘巴里) * | Ganbali | Coyampadi (southeast coast of India) |
| 加異勒國 | Jiayile | Cail (southeast India) |
| 祖法兒國 (左法兒) * | Zufa'er (Zuofa) | Dhofar, Ẓufār (south Arabia) |
| 溜山國 * | Liushan | Maldive Islands |
| 阿哇國 * | Awa | Awa (Myanmar) |
| 南巫里國 * | Nanwuli | Lambri (northern part of Sumatra) |
| 急蘭丹國 * | Jilandan | Kelantan (east coast Malay Peninsula) |
| 奇剌尼國 * | Qilani | ? |
| 夏剌比國 * | Xialabi | Arabia? |
| 窟察尼國 * | Kuchani | ? |
| 烏涉剌踢國 * | Wushelati | ? |
| 阿丹國 * | Adan | ʿAden (Jemen) |
| 魯密國 * | Lumi | Rum, "(East) Rome" (Asia Minor) |
| 彭加那國 * | Pengjiana | Bengal |
| 捨剌齊國 * | Shelaqi | Shūlistān? (Persia) |
| 八可意國 * | Bakeyi | ? |
| 坎巴夷替國 * | Kanbayiti | Coyampadi (southeast coast of India) |
| 黑葛達國 * | Heigeda | ? "Black" |
| 白葛達 * | Baigeda | ? "White" |
| 剌撒 * | Lasa | ? Arabia or Somali coast of Africa |
| 不剌哇 * | Bulawa | Barawa (east coast of Africa, close to Mogadishu) |
| 木骨都束 * | Mugudusu | Mogadishu (east coast of Africa) |
| 喃渤利 * | Nanboli | Lambri (northern part of Sumatra) |
| 千里達 * | Qianlida | ? (near Maldive Islands) |
| 沙里灣泥 * | Shaliwanni | Cananore (southeast coast of India) |
| 北狄 Northern Barbarians | ||
| 迤北小王子 | Yibei xiao wangzi | "The lesser lord(s) of the wide north" |
| 瓦剌三王 | Wala san wang | The three lords of the Oyirads |
| 順義王 | Shunyi Wang | Prince Shunyi, the leader of the Tartars (Dada 韃靼, i.e., Mongols) |
| 朶顏衛 | Duoyan wei | Garrison of Duoyuan (today's Inner Mongolia) |
| 福餘衛 | Fuyu wei | Garrison of Fuyu (today's Heilongjiang) |
| 泰寧衛 | Taining wei | Garrison of Taining (today's Jilin) |
| 東北夷 Northeastern Barbarians | ||
| 海西 | Haixi | Jurchens of Haixi |
| 建州 | Jianzhou | Jurchens of Jianzhou |
| 西戎 Western Barbarians | ||
| 哈密 | Hami | Hami (in today's Xinjiang) |
| 畏兀兒 | Weiwu'er | various Uyghurs |
| 安定衛 | Anding wei | Garrison of Anding (Gansu) |
| 罕東衛 | Handong wei | Garrison of Handong (close to Dunhuang, Gansu) |
| 赤斤蒙古 | Chijin Menggu | Čikin Mongols (close to Yumen 玉門, Gansu) |
| 曲先衛 | Quxian wei | Garrison of Quxian (Gansu) |
| 哈烈 * | Halie | Herāt (Afghanistan) |
| 哈三 * | Hasan | ? |
| 哈烈兒 * | Halie'er | ? |
| 沙的蠻 * | Sha di man | "barbarians of the desert"? |
| 哈失哈兒 * | Hashiha'er | Kašgar (today's Xinjiang) |
| 哈的蘭 * | Hadilan | Khotelan? (north of Badakhshān) |
| 賽蘭 * | Sailan | Sayram (Kazakhstan) |
| 掃蘭 * | Saolan | same as Sayram? |
| 亦力把力 (別失八里) * | Yilibali (Bieshibali) | Kulja (Yining 伊寧, today's Xinjiang) |
| 乜克力 * | Miekeli, Niekeli | ? (east of Hami) |
| 把丹沙 * | Badansha | Badakhshān (Afghanistan) |
| 把力黑 * | Balihei | Balkh (Afghanistan) |
| 俺力麻 * | Anlima | Almalik (today's Xinjiang) |
| 脫忽麻 * | Tuohuma | Tokmak (Uzbekistan) |
| 察力失 * | Chalishi | Chalish (western Xinjiang) |
| 幹失 * | Ganshi | ? |
| 卜哈剌 * | Buhala | Bukhara (Uzbekistan) |
| 怕剌 * | Pala | Balkh (Afghanistan) |
| 失剌思 * | Shiladi | Shīrāz (Persia) |
| 你沙兀兒 * | Nishawu'er | Nīshāpūr (Persia) |
| 克失迷兒 * | Keshimi'er | Kashmir |
| 帖必力思 * | Tiebilisi | Tabrīz (Persia) |
| 果撒思 * | Guosasi | ? |
| 火壇 * | Huotan | Khojend (Kokand) |
| 火占 * | Huozhan | idem |
| 苦先 * | Kuxian | Kuča (today's Xinjiang) |
| 沙六海牙 * | Shaliuhaiya | Shāhrokhia (near Khojend) |
| 牙昔 * | Yaxi | ? (Aksu, today's Xinjiang) |
| 牙兒干 * | Ya'ergan | Yarkant (today's Xinjiang) |
| 戎 * | Rong | ? |
| 白 * | Bai | ? |
| 兀倫 * | Wulun | ? |
| 阿速 * | Asu | Alans (Caucasus) |
| 阿端 * | Aduan | ? (Khotan, today's Xinjiang) |
| 耶思成 * | Yesicheng | ? |
| 坤城 * | Kuncheng | Kundūz? (Afghanistan) |
| 捨黑 * | Shehei | ? (Arabia) |
| 擺音 * | Baiyin | ? |
| 克癿 * | Keqie | ? |
| 土魯番 | Tulufan | Turfan (today's Xinjiang) |
| 火州 | Huozhou | Karakhodjo (east of Turfan) |
| 柳陳城 | Liuchen | Liuchen (east of Karakhodjo) |
| 撒馬兒罕 | Sama'erhan | Samarkand (Uzbekistan) |
| 魯迷 | Lumi | Rum, "Rome" |
| 天方國 | Tianfang | Mecca |
| 默德那國 | Modena | Medīna |
| 于闐國 | Yutian | Khotan |
| 日落國 * | Riluo | ? "Sunset Country" |
| 八答黑商 * | Badaheishang | Badākhshan (Afghanistan) |
| 俺都淮 * | Anduhei | Andkhoy (west of Bukhara) |
| 亦思弗罕 * | Yisifuhan | Isfahān (Persia) |
| 黑婁 * | Heilou | Khorāzān (Persia) |
| 額即癿 * | Ejiqie | ? |
| 哈辛 * | Haxin | ? |
| 烏思藏 | Wusi-Zang | Üs-Tsang (Tibet) |
| 長河西,魚通,寧遠 等 處 | places in Eastern Tibet | |
| 朶甘思 | Duogansi | mDo Khams, Dokham (Kham and Amdo) |
| 董卜韓胡 | Dongbuhan Hu | Maogong (Lesser Jinchuan, today's Sichuan) |
Order and names according to the revised Wanli-period version of the statutes Da-Ming huidian 大明會典, ch. 105-108 (Xuxiu siku quanshu 續修四庫全書 edition). Countries marked with an asterisk * are not specified as to the nature of their tributes, but are just listed. Identification according to Fairbank & Teng 1941. Further, mostly unified, names are found in the official dynastic history Mingshi 明史, ch. 208-220. |
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The Qing dynasty 清 (1644-1911), founded by the Manchus, established the Court of Colonial Affairs (lifanyuan 理藩院) in 1638, an institution specialising in dealing with the Mongols and in controlling them. The Court allowed maximum supervision and control with a minimum of irritation (Fairbank & Teng 1941: 160). This was achieved by granting rich emoluments to the Mongol nobility to purchase their loyalty. A first-class prince (ǰasaɣ), for instance, received grants of 2,000 tael/liang and 25 bolts of fine silk annually, while tayiǰi (Ch. taiji 台吉) and tabunang (Ch. tabunang 塔布囊) were given 100 tael and 4 bolts (Fairbank & Teng 1941: 161), plus allowances during their stay in Beijing. The tributes requested from the Mongol tribes were nominally small, but the Mongols contributed heavily to the many Qing wars, e.g., by supplying the Manchu army with horses.
The Qing acquired a few new tributary states, such as the Sultanate of Kokand (Ch. Huohan 浩罕), the Kazakhs, and Russia. These states were so thoroughly integrated into the tribute system that from 1700 onwards tributes from the northwest are scarcely mentioned in sources. Russia was the only Western state permitted to maintain a permanent residence in Beijing from 1721, though it was designated only as missionary, not political. The most important ambassador was Archimandrite Palladij, Pjotr I. Kafarov (1817-1878).
Even if regular visiting cycles were set out in imperial regulations, tributary states still had to seek permission to send a tribute mission. This applied to visits to congratulate, express condolences, or obtain a patent of investiture (cegao 冊告). The Qing introduced a rule that direct contact between foreigners and the imperial court was not allowed. All communications had to pass through the provincial governors (xunfu 巡撫) or the governors-general (zongdu 總督, by the Europeans called "viceroys") in the coastal provinces, mainly Guangdong and Fujian. Missions were limited to 100 persons, including high-ranking personnel and retainers. Only twenty officers were allowed to enter the capital, while the others had to remain in the suburbs. As for ships, no more than three were permitted, with crews of 100 per vessel. Offenders against these rules were to be deported or turned back. On the other hand, the Chinese government also arranged the funeral if an emissary died while in Beijing or on Chinese soil. Emissaries were received at a coastal or border town and escorted with rider tallies (kanhe 勘合) to Beijing and back.
The Emperor in Beijing (or, alternatively, in his summer residence in Jehol/Rehe 熱河) received the ambassadors, clothed in their native costumes, in the Taihe Hall 太和殿 of the Forbidden City, where they performed the kotow but were then allowed to sit and were served tea. The tribute objects were directly cashed in by the Imperial Household Department (neiwufu 内務府) and other institutions directly under the court.
The Qing allowed foreign merchants to sell their goods in Beijing, in markets at the Residence for Tributary Envoys, held for as long as they stayed in Beijing, namely 3-5 days, but without limit for Ryūkyū and Korea. Alternatively, some states were allowed to trade in seasonal markets at fixed locations. For Koreans, the border market was in Shengjing 盛京 (Shenyang 瀋陽, Liaoning); for people from Tibet or the southwest, in Zhongjiang 中江 near Chengdu 成都, Sichuan; and for northwesterners in Huining 會寧 near Lanzhou 蘭州, Ningxia; there was also a seasonal market in Qingyuan 慶源 (today's Zhaoxian 趙縣, Hebei). For overseas countries, the market was in Guangzhou (Western name Canton), where specialised, commissioned and licensed "hong" merchant guilds (known as Cohong or gonghang 公行) handled the economic transactions. The authorities strictly controlled market activities, not just to profit from the turnover tax, but also to protect the emperor's guest against usury (Fairbank & Teng 1941: 167).
When shipped from the border entries to Beijing, the wares were exempt from tariffs. Some goods were prohibited from sale (history books, certain types of satin, weapons, saltpetre, official costumes) or from being brought out of China (beams, nails, oil, hemp needed for shipbuilding, or to take passengers with them, barring castaways; rice only for provision; weapons only for necessary defence against pirates). It was not allowed "to linger in China" longer than permitted or to travel along routes other than the official ones. Even the rescuing and escorting back of Chinese "citizens" who had suffered shipwreck or been cast away was subject to strict regulation.
European countries were subject to the rules of the tributary mission, for instance. Portugal had obtained a "quarantine place" by leasing the peninsula of Macao (Aomen) permanently. The East India Company and other foreigners used this procedure and fitted themselves into the prevailing tribute system, which allowed them to trade - under defined restrictions - in Guangzhou and to wait for their return in Macao. Even after the First Opium war (1839-1842)), foreign merchants were restricted to the Factories on the island of Shamien (Shamian 沙面) at the gates of Guangzhou and were not allowed to enter the city until 1858. The Treaty of Nanking from 1842 allowed them residence in one of the five treaty ports or to leave the cities within a frame of one day's travel.
Holland (the Netherlands) enjoyed a special status. The first Dutch mission, led by Pieter van Goyer and Jacob van Keyser, was received in Beijing in 1656, and the first Portuguese mission, led by Manuel de Saldanha, in 1670. In total, the Chinese court received few Western embassies before the opening of the treaty ports in 1842, and newcomers such as Sweden or the United States never sent tribute missions at all. The Qing therefore introduced a category of its own, comprising nations engaged in commerce but not sending tributes (hushi zhuguo 互市諸國).
| 1520-21 | Tomé Pires (PT) |
| 1656 | Pieter van Goyer, Jacob van Keyser (NL) |
| 1656 | Fyodor Isakovich Baykov (RUS) |
| 1665? | Pieter van Hoorn (NL) |
| 1670 | Emmanuel de Saldanha (PT) |
| 1676 | Nikolai Gavrilovich Spathari (RUS) |
| 1678 | Bento Pereyra de Faria (PT) |
| 1689 | Fjodor Alexejevich Golovin (RUS) |
| 1693-94 | Eberhard Isbrand Ides (RUS) |
| 1705 | Charles-Thomas Maillard de Tournon (Holy See) |
| 1720 | Carlo Ambrogio Mezzabarba (Holy See) |
| 1720-21 | Lev Vassilievich Izmailov (RUS) |
| 1725 | Gotthard a Santa Maria (i.e. Emeric Plaskowitz), Ildefonso a Nativitate (Holy See) |
| 1726-27 | Sava Lukich Vladislavich-Raguzinsky (RUS) |
| 1727 | Alexandre Metello de Sousa e Menezes (PT) |
| 1753 | Francisco Xavier de Alsis Pacheco e Sampaio (PT) |
| 1767 | Ivan Ivanovich Kropotov (RUS) |
| 1793 | George Macartney (GB) |
| 1795 | Isaac Tithsing, Andreas Everardus van Braam Houckgeest (NL) |
| 1805-06 | Yurii Alexandrovich Golovkin (RUS) |
| 1816 | William Amherst (GB) |
In Chinese sources such as the richly illustrated Zhitongtu 職貢圖, European countries are listed alongside Southeast Asian states of the Malay Peninsula and the Indonesian Archipelago, while later-arriving nations are separated from these. Moreover, among Southeast Asian countries, many had ceased paying tributes to China since around 1450. The lists of tribute countries used in the 18th century were either outdated or did not accurately reflect the real locations and the economic and political importance of countries.
It is noteworthy that at the height of Qing power in the late 18th century, there was less tributary activity from the Southeast than half a century later, when the power of the Qing state began to wane. One reason for this is that the tribute system was much more than the Chinese way of diplomacy. It was also a system of international trade. As international trade intensified, the tribute system came under strain and was tested to its limits. Foreign states, represented by private merchants or licensed companies such as the British East India Company (EIC) or the Dutch Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie (VOC), or later by private English traders, requested higher trade volumes than the tribute system could accommodate. This can be seen in the case of Ryūkyū, an entrepôt of international Japanese trade, and the Philippines, where private Chinese overseas merchants organised trade between mainland China and the islands, which were again connected with the New World across the Pacific. The private junk trade had likewise grown immensely since the Yuan period, notwithstanding the long-term danger of piracy in the East and South China Sea and the official sea ban (haijin 海禁) between 1661 and 1684. The number of merchants engaging in overseas trade was considerable, but the Confucian disdain for merchants and the generally anti-commercial nature of the Confucian state ignored these developments. Rather than support Chinese merchants abroad, the court was therefore inclined to forbid international trade altogether.
With the lifting of the sea ban in 1684, the Qing established a multi-port trade system with several overseas customs, namely the Jiangnan Customs (Jiang haiguan 江海關) in Shanghai, the Zhejiang Customs (Zhe haiguan 浙海關) in Ningbo, the Fujian Customs (Min haiguan 閩海關) in Fuzhou 福州 and Xiamen 廈門, and the Guangdong Customs (Yue haiguan 粤海關) in Guangzhou. The latter was directly subordinate to the Imperial Household Department. From 1760 onwards, all overseas trade was restricted to Guangzhou, and the infamous Canton system was created.
The "tragic Chinese ignorance of the West" (Fairbank & Teng 1941: 190) and of the emergence of global trade was partially attributable to the belief that the tribute system enabled the Chinese court to receive foreign goods in sufficient quantities, while everything else – involving the expansion of trade – was deemed unnecessary.